

Secure Erasure of Flash Memory


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
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
Motivation

- Flash memory has become ubiquitous
 - Laptops, phones, USB devices, SSDs
- Sensitive data is increasingly being stored in flash memory
- Ensuring the safety of our data is a top priority




How Secure?

- Security is all about the amount of protection you need
 - Put another way:
How much time, effort, and money will someone spend to get at your data?
- What data needs protecting?
 - Consumers
 - Sensitive personal information
 - Businesses
 - Legal data retention policies
 - Valuable business data
 - Government
 - top secret, classified data



Hard Disks

- Secure erasure is not a new problem
- Much work has already been done for disks
 - Magnetic traces remain when data is overwritten
 - Erasure can be audited by inspecting the platters of a hard disk with an atomic force microscope
- Current solutions
 - SATA and SCSI commands for secure disk erasure
 - Must be correct and verified
 - Overwriting many times with specific patterns
 - Degaussing devices
 - Encryption and key protection



Technology Comparison

Hard Disks


- Special SATA/SCSI commands for erasure
- Encryption
- Multiple overwrites of same block
- Degaussing

- **Auditable – platter inspection with atomic force microscope**

Flash


- Proposed secure erase standards
- Encryption
- **Not possible with flash block address indirection**
- **?**

- **Auditable? Perhaps with a nanoprobe?**




Flash Erasure Requirements

1. Ability to ensure the contents of a single file can be securely erased
2. Guarantee erasure of all blocks on a device
3. Ensure that recovering remnant analog data from the cells would be cost prohibitive
4. Auditable
 - Secure erase features infrequently used, but their proper functioning must be verifiable
 - What is the flash equivalent of pulling out a hard disk platter and looking for analog traces of data



Consumer/Business Data Safety

- **Consumers and Businesses need a way to securely erase small bits of data from a device**
 - Remove personal information from a phone without losing all of the software, etc.
 - Delete a document from an SSD as part of a legal data retention requirement, without requiring reinstalling the operating system
- As with disks, simply deleting a file on a flash device is not enough
- On disks we can simply rewrite the contents of the file with zeros, but on flash its not so simple




Erasing a Single File


- Flash Translation Layers (FTL) make it impossible for higher level applications to know if a page of flash memory has been erased
 - FTLs remap the location of blocks of data to spread wear out across the device
 - Deleting or overwriting a file does not necessarily mean all of its pages have been overwritten
 - FTL and file system/operating system support will be necessary to securely erase single files

Old copy of file system metadata
Recovered by reading raw device


```
|.....|  
|...@.Y...c.r.'J.|  
|S.....@Z6.|  
|p.....rh..B~...|  
|.....|  
|...1x9.....N.e|  
|.w. .F....o.l.d.|  
|e.r.....EWF|  
|0L~1 . .@.dP:P:|  
|...dP:.....I |  
| . .@.dP:P:|  
|...dP:.....Bt..|  
|.....|  
|.....H.e|  
|.l.l.o....W.o.r.|  
|l.d.....t.x.HELL|  
|0W~1TXT .3.dP:P:|  
|...dP:.....|  
|.....|
```



Auditing with the Flash Drag Tester




- Provides a real time trace of all of the commands and data sent to a set of flash chips
- Allows us to track the lifetime of a piece of data





Securely Erasing the Entire Device

- Existing flash security and erasure standards propose that:
 - Security be provided by specific erase commands, overwriting data, or through cryptography
 - Whole device erases will continue, even after a power failure, until completed
- **Auditability and verification should be a significant part of any future standards**
 - As with hard disks this is a critical characteristic that can influence device selection




Physical Security

- Data security through the normal interface is adequate for most users, but physical security is important as well
- Can we audit to verify that even a nanoprobe will not reveal anything about the past contents of the cells?
 - Similar to looking at platters with an atomic force microscope




Current Flash Destruction Techniques

- Current techniques
 - Grinding up the chip into millions of pieces
 - Melting in acid
- These are done for disks as well
- Destruction tools must be fast and portable
 - As an example, embassies under siege and military forces need to be able to quickly destroy data
 - Transporting the device before destruction is a security risk



The Future

- An auditable, secure solution for the erasure of flash devices is needed
 - Standards are a good first step
 - Single file erasure is important too
 - Needs to pass physical probing as well
- A study of what can be recovered through physical probing of the cells would be valuable
 - something similar to disk platters with the atomic force microscope



Thank You

Questions?

