



Future Trends in Flash Drive Encryption

Devesh Ahuja
Vijay Ahuja, Ph.D.
Cipher Solutions, Inc.

Flash Memory Summit 2010
Santa Clara, CA





USB Host based security - NOW

HOST-BASED

USB access controlled through the host

Encryption material saved in the host

User needs to enter a secret/password to

- Access the drive
- Decrypt the data

STANDALONE DEVICE SECURITY

Password level security

- Additional Measures to increase security
 - Token/ Cards for stronger authentication





Flash Memory Security Issues

- **Monitor/restrict files going to the Flash**
 - **Port Controls**
 - **Log meta data of files to and from the Flash**
 - **Need to maintain and secure the logs**
- **Authenticate the user**
- **Encrypt files to prevent disclosure**
 - **Need to maintain and secure the Keys and the Algorithms**
 - **Password-based keys commonly used**





Future of Encryption

ENVIRONMENT OF INCREASING INSECURITY

- Expanding enterprise – home offices
- Increasing communication devices
- Mobility
- Growing email traffic
- Growing personal information
- Increasing storage sizes
- Social sites
- New and emerging threats to data



Future Trends in Encryption -

ENCRYPTION IS NEEDED EVERYWHERE.... BUT...

- 1. Should be Simpler and Easier to use**
 - 2. Should Cost less**
 - 3. Should yield Higher performance – hardware?**
 - 4. Should comply with more and more of:**
 - Government Regulations: GLBA, HIPAA, SB1386,...most states have regs for Privacy Protection**
 - Industry Standards: NIST; ISO 11568-1, 11568-2, 11568-4; PCI; IEEE P1619; ..**
- § Should be Ubiquitous – What about Interoperability?**





Key Management Issues – Keys needed for 10 or 20 or ?? Years

- Key retention for stored data – years
- Keys are NOT easy to upgrade
- Keys are not easy to be:
 - Secured
 - Available
 - Backed-up
- Key management technologies do not address the issue of aging
 - Key & Algorithm refresh every 5? Years
 - To resist brute-force attacks
- Secured keys are often as secure as passwords (+ Tokens!!)
- Backed up Keys help but introduce new issues
- Lost keys may be as bad as **losing data**



NIST 800-131



ALGORITHM	SIZES	EQUIVALENT STRENGTH
Two-key Triple DES Encryption	Acceptable through 2010 Restricted use from 2011 through 2015	80 bits
Two-key Triple DES Decryption	Acceptable through 2010 Legacy use after 2010	80 bits
Three-key Triple DES Encryption and Decryption	Acceptable	112 bits
SKIPJACK Encryption	Acceptable through 2010	80 bits
SKIPJACK Decryption	Acceptable through 2010 Legacy use after 2010	80 bits
AES-128 Encryption and Decryption	Acceptable	128 bits
AES-192 Encryption and Decryption	Acceptable	192 bits
AES-256 Encryption	Acceptable	256 bits



Flash Mem
Santa Clara

Encryption Algorithms...moving targets

RSA, DES, MD5, SHA, Blowfish, Diffie-Hellman, El Gamal, and AES.

AES (256 bits); SHA (256 bits)

RSA 1024
stop 12/31/10-13
NIST 800-131

**AES (128 bits); SHA1 (128 bits);
RSA 1024**

SHA1 128
stop 12/31/10
NIST 800-131

DES (56bit), MD5 (80 bits)

MD5 (1991)
Broken Dec 2008

DES (1976)
Broken January 1999

CDMF (40-bit)





NIST 800-131 Hash Function Transition

- | Hash Function | Usage |
|---------------------|---|
| SHA 1 | Digital Signature Generation: acceptable thru 2010; deprecated 2011-2013

Digital Signature verification: Acceptable thru 2010; legacy use after 2010

Non-digital signature generation |
| SHA-224,256,384,512 | Acceptable for all hash function applications |
| | |

Challenges for upgrading Keys

Example – PKI Certificate Signing Keys: SHA1 (128) -> 224/256 bits

- If a CA signs a Certificate with SHA 2, and the Relying Party (e.g. Web Servers) cannot handle SHA 2, the authentication fails
- Need to test various combos of:
 - End user Certificate
 - CA's OCSP/CRL signing certificate
 - Issuing CA's End-entity Signing Certificate (Trust Chain to be all SHA2)
 - Relying Party's capability to verify SHA2 signatures
- **DUE 12/31/2010**



- Password-based keys => Security equals password security
 - Change passwords (keys) frequently
- Key Systems – Used for storing encrypted data
 - Secured Key Storage Devices
 - Key Management Servers
- Interact with Other Cryptographic Devices
 - Smart Cards
 - Memory Cards
- Storage of Keys Offline
 - Tape
 - Optical




Key Management – Protecting Keys

Non-Cryptographic Protection

- Time Stamps – Restrict Key Use to Specific Periods
- Sequence Numbering – Limit Re-Play Attacks
- Multiple key shares “k of N”

Cryptographic Protection

- Hardware Security Modules –
 - Secure cryptoprocessor
 - Targeted at managing digital keys
 - Accelerating in terms of digital signings
 - Providing strong authentication to access critical keys for server applications
- Companies that manufacture HSMs: Luna, Ncipher, Thales, HP, Safenet, etc.





Cipher Solutions, Inc.

Cipher Solutions, Inc.



PROVIDING IT SECURITY SERVICES SINCE 2001

**Department of Defense Largest Banks
Storage Networking Vendors IT Security Vendors
Storage Security Vendors**

IA Services for Federal/State Governments

- IT Security Design
- C&A using DIACAP
- Key Management; Data Security
- IPsec, SSL design

Application Security Services

- Security Design of large application
- PKI-usage and design for Key Management Application
- PKI-enabling of applications
- Security design for future Application Architectures

PKI Services

- PKI Design – from RFP/vendor-selection to delivery of Millions of certificates
- Develop CP, CPS and Sub Agreements
- Key Management Design and deployment
- Best Practices for Key Lifecycle Management of PKI and Symmetric keys
- Support Web Trust Audit
- Digital Signature application design

Data Security Services

- Data Security newsletter
- Estimating Data Risk – Developed a new approach for computing Risk metrics
- Disaster Recovery plan
- Storage Security monthly newsletter
- Assessing Risk (metrics)



Cipher Solutions, Inc.



THANK YOU

Dr. Vijay Ahuja
President
Cipher Solutions, Inc.
vijay@CipherSolutions.com
1-919-848-3040

