



**NVSL**  
Non-volatile Systems Laboratory

# Challenges in Reliably Sanitizing Solid State Disks

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Non-volatile Systems Laboratory  
UC San Diego

# Confidential Data



# Overview

- **Past work in sanitizing disks**
- US Coast Guard RMMs
  - Introduction
  - Sanitization & Evaluation
  - Report
- Scramble and Finally Erase (SAFE)


# Previous Work: Reliably Sanitizing Solid-State Disks

- ▶ Published in 2011:  
Reliably Erasing Data from Flash-Based Solid State Drives  
Michael Wei, Laura M. Grupp, Frederick E. Spada, and Steven Swanson  
9th USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies (FAST' 11)
- ▶ Need to **verify** sanitization effectiveness
  - ▶ Built-in mechanisms are reliable when implemented correctly
  - ▶ Hard-drive techniques don't necessarily work
- ▶ Sanitizing single files (in place) is difficult
  - ▶ Software overwrite cannot reliably sanitize
  - ▶ Scrubbing allows us to sanitize files by modifying the FTL

# Previous Work: Reliably Sanitizing Solid-State Disks

SSD Name	Controller	SECURITY ERASE UNIT (ATA-3)	SECURITY ERASE UNIT ENHANCED (ATA-3)
A	1	No	No
B	2	No (Reports yes)	No
C	1	Partial (Bugged)	No
D	3	Partial (Bugged)	No
E	4	Crypto Scrambles	Crypto Scrambles
F	5	Yes	Yes
G	6	Yes	No
H	7	Yes	Yes
I	8	Yes	Yes

# Previous Work: Reliably Sanitizing Solid-State Disks



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# Coast Guard RMMs



- ▶ Part of the **NATO** ISR INTEROPERABILITY ARCHITECTURE (NIIA)
  - ▶ One storage interface and device for all NATO organizations
  - ▶ Can support SSDs or Hard Drive Arrays
- ▶ Need to be sanitized
  - ▶ At end of-life
  - ▶ If unit is in danger (i.e. plane crash, hostile takeover, etc.)
  - ▶ **If security classification level changes**
  - ▶ Want to use the same drive for both classified and unclassified missions



# Sanitization and evaluation

- Wrote our fingerprint using the USB interface
- Returned drives to Coast Guard for sanitization
- Attempted to recover the fingerprint



# Problems


- ▶ Don't want to contact the manufacturer every time
- ▶ Talking to the manufacturer is expensive and time consuming
  - ▶ Manufacturer has to allocate engineers
  - ▶ Engineers take time to produce a report
  - ▶ Manufacturer might not have designed the controller
  - ▶ Somebody has to interpret to manufacturers report
- ▶ Easiest to verify a drive that is all 0s

# Overview

- ▶ Past work in sanitizing disks
- ▶ US Coast Guard RMMs
  - ▶ Introduction
  - ▶ Sanitization & Evaluation
  - ▶ Report
- ▶ **Scramble and Finally Erase (SAFE)**

# SAFE: Scramble and Finally Erase


13



- Traditional Sanitization Process
  - Sanitize and Initialize in a single step
  - Drive is *INITIALIZED* after a sanitize


# SAFE: Scramble and Finally Erase

14




- ▶ Crypto-Erase "Sanitization" Process
  - ▶ Delete keys
  - ▶ Drive is *INITIALIZED* after a sanitize

# SAFE: Scramble and Finally Erase



SAFE breaks this up and adds two new states: *KEYLESS* and *VERIFIABLE*

# SAFE: Scramble and Finally Erase




Scramble: Drive is actively being encrypted

- On sanitize, delete the keys (*KEYLESS*)
- This step takes milliseconds



# SAFE: Scramble and Finally Erase



Erase: Perform a block erase after scramble

- We can easily verify the drive (*VERIFIABLE*)
- This step takes minutes

# Conclusion

- ▶ Sanitizing storage media is essential for data security
- ▶ Need to **verify** sanitization effectiveness
- ▶ Metadata and encryption can make verification difficult
- ▶ SAFE is a system that allows us to verify drives with the protection of encryption