

Data Security with SSD

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- With a circuit build in disk drive controller
 - Encrypts all data into drive media
 - All SED encrypted all the time
 - Decrypt data automatically
 - Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is de facto algorithm
- Transparent or invisible to the user once encryption key established
 - Key lost will equivalent to a full erase of media .





- SED can be made with a interface bridge
 - Convert a commodity drive to SED for cost reason
 - Input and output interface not necessary to be the same
 - Example : USB to SATA bridge with encryption
- Encrypting bridge can introduce more advanced function



- Change SED encrypting algorithm from AES
- Dynamic change drive partition with key protection
- Help to establish new crypto standard to SED with min cost



- Synchronous and Asynchronous Key encryption
- Media Encryption Key (MEK) is a Synchronous key
 - Data is encrypted by Media Key
 - Whole Data sectors group can only have one media key
 - Once Data is encrypted, It will stay with the Key
 - In general, Media key is hide inside the SSD
 - Attacker is always to break media key, not the data itself
- MEK has to protect by asynchronous key
 - Key encrypt Key (KEK) is the major challenge



Flash Memory Life Cycle of a SED Key Diagram





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- Generation of Media Key
 - Either by on board SED controller or third party pre load
- Backup and Storage
 - Hide within SED security boundary or remote backup
 - Distribution and Loading if remotely
- Normal Use and Replacement
 - Media Key can not be replaced during life cycle,
- Archival For data no longer been active
- End of Key's Life Cycle Change MEK = Erasure



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Flash Memory Key Management(KMS) & Escrow

- Local Key management (WannaCry Proven?)
 - KEK is store on hide section, should not contact any OS
 - Usually use password to retrieve MEK from KEK
- Centralized key management
 - MEK is Encrypt by public key, and store in KMS at key generation phase



- At boot time, SED acquired KEK from KMS, then decode by private key
- X.509 certification is most common practice to transport





- China pushed its own encryption standard 1999
- Establish "commercial cryptography" testing lab 2006
 - Only certified products are allowed to be sold in China
 - Implements Commercial Cryptographic algorithms
 - Affect core function such as hardware such as
 - Hardware Security Module (HSM)
 - Smart Card Chip, Trust Platform Module(TPM)
 - USB token and flash driver.HDD/SSD
 - Software and firmware product are not affected

Lawfully, no foreign encryption products are allowed to be sold Flash Memor Orunused in China Santa Clara, CA



- SM2 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
 - Competitor of ECDSA
 - Use on Key Encryption Key (KEK)
- SM3 Hash Function
 - Competitor of SHA-256
 - Together with SM2 and a Key Derivation function(KDF)
 - Use for Key transportation such as X.509
- SM4 Block cipher symmetric algorithm
 - Competitor of AES-128
 - Use on Media Encryption Key (MEK)







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- Analysis is based on SMIC 55nm Proess.
- SM4 is 5 times slower due to its long logic chain delay
- AES logic counts are five times as SM4

Round	Clk Cycle	Clk Frequency(MHZ)	Bit Rate(Gbit/Second)	Gate Count
100%	32	250	1.00	8,486
50%	16	142	1.14	15,905
25%	8	77	1.23	31,071
AES128	10	370	4.70	42,613
AES256	14	370	3.40	42,513